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THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
Primary Causes of Japanese Success
Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
The year 2005 is the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War.It also marks the hundredth anniversary of the end of the Russo-Japanese
War. For Japan, and for Western powers as well, that war, fought in the Far East
in 1904 and 1905, has significance in many respects.
Japan joined the international community in the mid-nineteenth century.
That period of history is known as “the age of imperialism” and was character-
ized by the dominance of Western nations on the world scene. The Japanese,
however, because of their eagerness to learn, capacity to adapt, discipline, and
frugality, caught up with the West much more quickly than was expected.
As Japan expanded its contacts with foreign nations, however, many prob-
lems with those countries emerged. Japanese leaders, though they had little ex-
perience in handling diplomatic issues, dealt with these issues in ways that in
most cases proved advantageous to Japan. Through the successful settlement of
such issues, they raised the nation’s stature in the international community. In
the process, the Japanese government developed appropriate strategies for cop-
ing with diplomatic problems and showed excellent leadership, firmness, and
coordination skills in the execution of those strategies. They also showed a sense
of balance in estimating situations. Of all the episodes that vitally affected Japan
in that era, the Russo-Japanese War (like the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95)
most changed the future of the nation. This article will examine Japanese strat-
egy and policy as well as leadership in the Russo-Japanese War. Japan’s success in
the Russo-Japanese War (in implicit contrast to its failure in World War II
thirty-five years later) shows that its leaders at the turn of the twentieth century
did a much better job than their successors with respect to management of
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public opinion, goals, alliances, risk assessment, intelligence, sabotage,
interservice cooperation, and negotiated war termination.
THE EAST ASIAN SITUATION IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY:
THE JAPANESE PERCEPTION
In 1639, Japan closed itself to all Western powers except the Netherlands. In
1854, following the visit of U.S. warships under Commodore Matthew Calbraith
Perry in 1853, Japan reopened its doors to the United States, the United King-
dom, and Russia. The following year, France was included by the Treaty of Am-
ity. Of these Western powers, Britain and Russia had the strongest impact on the
national security policy of the Japanese government, which had just assumed
power after the 250-year Tokugawa shogunate. Japanese leaders judged that the
British intended to include Japan within their sphere of influence (see map 1).
Similarly, the Japanese leaders were in general unfavorable to Russian policy
in the Far East. Russia, defeated in the Crimean War in 1856 by the United King-
dom and France, had lost an opportunity to expand into the Balkan states. In ad-
dition, and in spite of the Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish war, the
chancellor of unified Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, had wisely and effectively
stopped the southward momentum of Russia toward the Balkans, by the 1878
Treaty of Berlin. As a result, Russia turned its foreign policy from southward to
eastward, accelerating the speed of its expansion to the east. This switch inevita-
bly generated friction with the British in Asia. The first incident was conflict be-
tween Great Britain and Russia in Afghanistan, which ended in political
compromise. The compromise practically stopped the momentum of Russia’s
southern expansion, forcing even greater Russian emphasis on expansion to-
ward the Far East.
Here, a review of the chronology of Russian eastward expansion is necessary.
In 1847, Russia established a governor general for eastern Siberia, whose office at
Petropavlovsk acted as headquarters for eastern and southern movement in the
Far East. The Russians expanded their influence to the mouth of the Amur River,
where they established a principal base, Nikolayevsk, substantially increasing
their power in the region. But this expansion generated friction with China. The
territorial dispute was settled by the treaties of Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860).
Reconciliation meant, however, the end of further expansion toward China.
At this point, Russia was forced to change its focus to the coastal areas of the
Sea of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The Russians reached the best natural
harbor in the area, Vladivostok, in 1860. At about this time Russia tried to force
the Japanese off Karafuto (Sakhalin Island). This was accomplished, but at the
expense of another territorial dispute. Russia finally acquired Sakhalin Island in
exchange for the cession of the Chi-Shima Retto (Kuril Islands) to Japan in 1875.
1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
3
Koda: The Russo-Japanese War—Primary Causes of Japanese Success
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
Furthermore, to Japa-
nese eyes Russia ap-
peared to be trying to
annex Hokkaido (the
second-largest main is-
land of Japan, only thirty
nautical miles south of
Sakhalin),  by regularly
sending Russian ships
and people there. The
reason was that many
ports on Hokkaido did
not freeze in winter; that
would have made the is-
land an acquisition of
immense importance.
Russia also noted the
strategic importance of
the Tsushima Islands,
which lie between Japan
and the Korean Penin-
sula. In 1861, only a year
a f ter the se izure of
Vladivostok, four Rus-
sian ships were sent to
Tsushima, and a landing
force occupied a small
port on the island. How-
ever, the then-helpless
Tokugawa shogunate
government asked for help from the British, who sent two warships from the
East India Fleet. This Russian expansion attempt was thus frustrated.
In 1884, Russia established at Khabarovsk a governor general for the Amur
region, to be responsible for the development of Far Eastern Russia. A new ship-
ping route was opened between Odessa, on the Black Sea, and Vladivostok the
following year. More importantly, in 1891 construction of the Trans-Siberian
Railroad commenced and the East Asian Squadron was reinforced. These devel-
opments triggered serious “Northern concern,” as it was known, among Japa-
nese leadership of both the Tokugawa shogunate and the succeeding Meiji
government.1 This pattern of Russian southward expansion in the Far East was




Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 2, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss2/3
perceived by a majority of ordinary Japanese as aggression. A cornerstone-laying
ceremony for the Trans-Siberian Railroad at Vladivostok in 1891 made a partic-
ularly strong impression.
THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR AND TRIPLE INTERVENTION
The widespread and strong sense of a Russian threat produced in the minds of
the Japanese a conviction that it was necessary to establish buffer zones between
Japan and Russia. Japan saw the Korean Peninsula and southern Manchuria as
potential buffers and therefore made it a policy to prevent these areas from being
possessed by Russia. In the early 1890s, however, Japanese leaders estimated that it
would be difficult for Russia to seize and permanently occupy them until the com-
pletion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, probably more than ten years in the future.
The Japanese in the 1890s saw China, which under the Qing dynasty had long
been a teacher as well as historical rival, as, like Russia, a potential threat.2 In fact,
the Japanese saw Qing as capable of attempting to annex Korea, which made the
threat urgent. In light of domestic chaos that had existed in Korea since 1884, Ja-
pan decided to forestall Qing intervention. In 1894 and 1895 Japan fought the
Sino-Japanese War with the goal of thwarting the expansion of Qing into the
Korean Peninsula, by way of establishing a buffer zone there. This objective was
partially realized by an advantageous settlement at the end of the war. For Rus-
sia, however, the outcome of the Sino-Japanese War was an opportunity to
strengthen its “proceed east and south” policy, which had once been stopped by
its treaties of 1858 and 1860 with China. For the major world powers, the war
served to expose the incompetence of the Qing military.
The peace treaty concluded at the Japanese western port city of Shimonoseki
in March 1895 that ended the Sino-Japanese War contained the following major
points (see map 2):
• Qing recognized the right of self-determination of Korea.
• Qing ceded the Liaotung Peninsula, Taiwan (Formosa), and the Pescadores
Islands to Japan.
• Qing paid war reparations to Japan (200 million tael/liang).3
• Qing gave Japan most-favored-nation status.
• Qing opened several ports and gave Japan free navigation rights along the
Yangtze River.
Russia, for which Japan’s presence in China and Korea, especially in the
Liaotung Peninsula, had become an obstacle to expansion, concentrated its efforts
on expelling Japanese forces from China and Korea. Russia perceived Japan as a
potential, and maybe the most dangerous, challenger to its interests in China. To
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this end, Russia—along
with France (a partner in
the Franco-Russian en-
tente) and Germany (which
wanted to turn Russian
eyes away from Europe)—
cunningly reacted with
superficial anger to the rec-
onciliation between Qing
and Japan. In April 1895,
immediately after the con-
clusion of the Shimonoseki
Treaty, all three nations de-
clared that Japanese pos-
session of the Liaotung
Peninsula represented an
obstacle to peace and sta-
bility in the Far East, and
“recommended” that Japan
relinquish its rights there.
A SOUND DECISION BY THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
The government of Japan, headed by Prime Minister Hirobumi Ito, considered
the following three options in response to the pressure being applied by Russia,
France, and Germany:
1. Declare war against these three nations
2. Request a conference of the major powers
3. Accept the “recommendation” and return control of the Liaotung Peninsula to Qing.
Option one proved impracticable. Japan was too weak to declare war against
these major world powers. Option three was considered too humiliating. The Ito
cabinet therefore attempted to implement option two, with some behind-
the-scenes diplomacy, but it quickly realized the hopelessness of the attempt.
When Ito saw the real situation, he was quick enough to switch his strategy. The
Japanese government reluctantly decided to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula,
which had been obtained at the cost of a large number of Japanese soldiers’ lives,
and return it to Qing. The decision was conveyed to these three nations on 5May
1895, and the Meiji emperor officially announced the decision directly to the
Japanese people.4 This willful intervention by Russia, France, and Germany
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fueled resentment, particularly against Russia, which had obviously been, in
Japanese eyes, the principal perpetrator of the Triple Intervention.
It was in this episode that the Japanese experienced for the first time since the
opening of their country the reality of the international power game. The Japa-
nese people, whose nation had joined the Western-governed international club
only twenty-five years before, now saw the cold reality of international rela-
tions—that the weak were the victims of the strong. Both the Japanese people
and their government believed that the concessions gained through the treaty of
1895 were lawful in light of current international custom and, further, had been
bought with the blood of Japanese soldiers. But these gains were now negated
and finally lost due to what seemed an absurd intervention of three nations.
Moreover, the Japanese people were angered that their country was so weak that
it had no choice but to accept the actions of the great powers. This quickly en-
compassed the nation. It did not take long for a strong hatred of Russia and a de-
sire for revenge to grow in most Japanese minds.
There was a positive side to this incident. The Japanese leaders learned the les-
son that well-balanced national power was the most important condition of sur-
vival in the international community, where the law of the jungle largely
prevailed. In order to cope with the seemingly helpless situation in which Japan
now found itself, the government started a vigorous nationwide campaign,
known as Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan—“Submit to any hardships to achieve revenge,” or,
“Accept the humiliation now; revenge will come later.”5 The campaign united
the Japanese people.
Meanwhile, the Japanese government decided to build up national power, es-
pecially military, in the quickest possible manner. The Diet accepted an ambi-
tious force buildup plan in its first session after the intervention. The size of the
Imperial Army was to be increased from seven divisions to thirteen. The Impe-
rial Navy program (purchases from foreign countries, mainly Britain and the
United States) called for 104 new ships, including four battleships and eleven ar-
mored cruisers, to be completed between 1896 and 1905.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA
The Western powers fully took advantage of postwar chaos in China (see map 3).
• In 1896, Russia gained the right to build the “East Qing Railway” through
Manchuria, a shorter route than the Trans-Siberian Railway.
• In 1897, Germany sent warships and troops to occupy Tsingtao, in response
to the murder of three German missionaries on the Shantung Peninsula.
• In 1898, Germany forced Qing to grant a lease to Tsingtao.
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• Immediately after the signing of the German lease, Russia sent a fleet to
Port Arthur and Talien to intimidate the Qing government into a lease of
the former, at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula. This maneuver was
successful; Russia gained the port and extended to it a branch line of the
East Qing Railway. Thus the Liaotung Peninsula, which was one of the
major objectives of the Triple Intervention and had been a main concern as
well, fell into the hands of Russia, a ringleader of the intervention.
• In the same year, Britain concluded a lease on Weihaiwei, on the Shantung
Peninsula.
• In 1899, France signed a lease for Kwangchowwan.
The growing Chinese nationalism against outrageous activities by Western
great powers was transformed into a campaign to expel them. The campaign ex-
panded rapidly within the country in 1899, and in 1900 the violence against for-
eigners escalated into a severe incident, the Boxer Rebellion.
In order to ensure the security of Beijing, eight nations, including Britain, the
United States, France, Russia, and Japan, sent troops to the city, which they
barely secured by the end of 1900. As a part of this military campaign, Russia
sent a large force to Manchuria; however, the force remained in the area even
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after the cessation of hostilities in Beijing. In spite of opposition by the Qing
government, which was backed up in this regard by Japan and Britain, Manchu-
ria was for all intents and purposes occupied by Russia in that year. Russia also
proposed that Japan would agree to neutralize the Korean Peninsula, but the
Japanese government refused the proposal. It was felt that neutralization of the
peninsula would eventually lead to an unwilling ratification of Russian control
of Manchuria.
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY
If the Korean Peninsula fell into their hands, the Russians, who already main-
tained a large force in Manchuria, would gain substantial freedom of action in
the Far East. Additionally, the security of Japan would be weakened; the inde-
pendence of Japan itself could be seriously jeopardized. The Japanese govern-
ment’s options for favorably resolving this difficult situation were to expel
Russia from Manchuria by military means or forestall a Russian invasion into
the Korean Peninsula through a diplomatic treaty or an agreement with Russia.
The initial assessment by the government was that the first option was practi-
cally impossible, because the military power of Japan at that time was still too
small to counter the Russian force in Manchuria. Therefore, and somewhat sur-
prisingly, given Japan’s hostility toward Russia, the Japanese leaders started think-
ing of ways to implement the second option. The idea was that Japan would accept
Russian seizure of Manchuria if Russia accepted Japanese control over Korea.
Heated debates arose within the government, and no conclusion was reached.
A Unique Decision-Making Body: The Genro
In order to clarify the decision-making process of the government of Japan in
the Meiji era, a unique Japanese mechanism or entity widely referred to as the
Genro must be mentioned.
Genro is an informal, collective term embracing several of the most influen-
tial and experienced politicians and military leaders of the Meiji era. There are
minor disagreements today as to which particular individuals it comprised. But
four people—ex–prime minister Hirobumi Ito, ex–financial minister Kaoru
Inoue, hero of the Meiji Restoration War and Army general Aritomo Yamagata,
and ex–prime minister Masayoshi Matsukata—are generally considered to have
been the most influential Genro members at the time. The Genro served as spe-
cial advisers to the Meiji emperor. Many fundamental issues of the nation were
brought to them. They discussed issues, identified the underlying problems, and
developed strategies and policies for dealing with them. They also assisted in the
implementation of those strategies, by coordinating not only within the govern-
ment but also between the government and the military. The group also acted as
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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a go-between for the government and the economic community. The advantage
of the Genro was that its members had no official portfolios, as it was not an offi-
cial organ. Thus, the Genro could act collectively as honest brokers, free from
“noisy and willful” external influences and so in a position to provide ideal
“classroom answers.” Their well thought out recommendations often helped the
government make sound “real world” decisions about the vital issues of the day.
The Genro input to the decision-making process immediately before the
Russo-Japanese War included advising Prime Minister Taro Katsura on rea-
soned approaches to many crucial decisions. The most important point was that
although Japan’s Western-style constitutional monarchy was tempered to this
extent by a traditional Japanese approach to problem solving, the final decision
was made by the prime minister—and once the prime minister had decided, the
Genro did not take any further action unless he asked it to do so. Otherwise,
what it had to do, and actually did, was keep complete silence. This custom pre-
vented the emergence of two different national policies on single issues. Thus,
the mechanism of the Genro guaranteed the credibility of the government in the
international community as well as before the Japanese people.
Approaches to the Russian Issue
With regard to policy toward Russia, there were two schools of thought in the
Japanese government. The first was a pro-Russia school, backed by Ito when he
was the prime minister, and two major Genro, Inoue and Matsukata. They
strongly supported the second, diplomatic option mentioned above—accepting
the status quo in Manchuria in return for preeminent Japanese influence in Ko-
rea; Ito started an effort toward a possible Russo-Japanese treaty in 1901. How-
ever, the Russian government would accept only economic Japanese activities on
the Korean Peninsula, not political influence. This hard-line Russian position
proved fatal to this approach. Ito’s idea was shown to be impracticable, gradually
lost support, then finally collapsed. In June 1901 Ito turned over power to Taro
Katsura, becoming an “uncrowned giant.”
The second school of thought was a pro-Anglo/Germany faction, supported
by Genro Yamagata and Katsura (prime minister as of June 1901), as well as For-
eign Minister Jutaro Komura (appointed in September 1901). These men op-
posed the idea of a Russo-Japanese treaty. They felt that if Japan were to secure
its sovereignty and interest in China, confrontation with Russia might be un-
avoidable. They acknowledged that Japan, acting alone, could not stop Russia,
let alone defeat it, but argued that it could handle Russia if supported by Western
countries that shared its interests in the region. The Japanese leadership started
thinking about the possibility of an alliance with nations whose policies were
counter to Russian expansion in the Far East—that is, Britain and Germany. The
K O D A 1 9
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new Katsura cabinet began negotiations with the two nations. However, it found
Germany reluctant to support the idea, due to its complicated ties with Russia,
and quickly modified the plan to a single Anglo-Japanese alliance. Foreign Min-
ister Komura eagerly explained to his colleagues the advantages of alliance with
the British and the disadvantages of alliance with Russia, and in December 1901
he convinced the cabinet to seek an alliance with the United Kingdom. The
treaty was concluded in February 1902.6
The Japanese Sense of the Russian Threat
As previously stated, Japanese suspicion of Russia was a result of the Triple In-
tervention of 1895 and was reinforced by the Russian occupation of Manchuria
after the Boxer Rebellion. In addition to this, a buildup of the Russian East Asian
Squadron at Port Arthur and a naval exercise in the Yellow Sea in May 1903 were
perceived as a menace. Russian troops stayed in Manchuria beyond an October
1903 deadline that had been agreed between Qing and Russia in April 1902. Far
from withdrawing, Russia reinforced its force in Manchuria that month with
troops from European Russia. At the same time, Japanese intelligence sources in
Europe reported that additional Russian naval forces, including a battleship, two
armored cruisers, seven destroyers, and four torpedo boats, had left European waters
for the Far East and had reached the Mediterranean by December 1903. In January
1904, a substantial increase in Trans-Siberian Railroad traffic was reported.7
Unlike the Japanese military and political leaders before the Second World
War, the government of this period emphasized intelligence and conducted
well-organized collection activities. The Japanese legation in London played a
key role in this effort; London, which was in those days the center of the world in
many respects, was flooded with an almost infinite variety of information from
everywhere. As for regional intelligence, the government conducted ambitious
collection activities in Beijing. Japan was able to obtain from such sources a vast
amount of invaluable intelligence, which had a strong influence on its decision
making.8 Specifically, it was intelligence reports that in 1903 persuaded the Japa-
nese government that Russian war preparation was in the final phase and that
the breakout of war was imminent.
THE JAPANESE NAVAL BUILDUP
Immediately after the Triple Intervention in 1895, the Diet approved a new
ten-year naval buildup program for the period from 1896 to 1905. Because the
goal was a fleet of six battleships and six armored cruisers, this plan was widely
known as the “six-six fleet program” in Japan. The last ship was the Mikasa,
which was to be Admiral Heihachiro Togo’s flagship at the Battle of Tsushima.
Eventually, Japan started the war with this six-six fleet.
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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In 1903, an additional shipbuilding program was put in place to implement
an amendment to the Anglo-Japanese treaty, ratified by the Diet, obligating Ja-
pan to maintain a fleet larger than that of any third nation in the region. This
supplement added three battleships and five armored cruisers. These ships,
however, were not ready in time for the war.
On 28 December 1903 the Japanese government decided to accelerate the
construction program. It also tried to purchase two battleships being built in
Britain for the Chilean navy. The Russian government made strong objections;
the British rebuffed this Russian opposition, but the Japanese government failed
to allocate funds for the purchase before the dissolution of the nineteenth Impe-
rial Diet. The Diet was dissolved for domestic reasons that had nothing to do
with the naval buildup, but the ultimate result was the failure of the attempt to
purchase the two battleships. (The British government frustrated a Russian at-
tempt to acquire the warships itself by purchasing them for the Royal Navy.)
The Japanese government took immediate action to make up for this failure
to purchase battleships in the United Kingdom. First, it issued an imperial ordi-
nance allocating funds for a domestic naval buildup. Second, the government
purchased two armored cruisers under construction in an Italian shipyard for
the Argentine navy. The two ships, Kasuga and Nisshin, arrived at Japan in April
1904, two months after hostilities broke out, and effectively made good the com-
bat loss of two battleships, the Hatsuse and Yashima, to Russian mines on 15 May
1904. Admiral Togo assigned these two armored cruisers to the battleship force,
so as to take full advantage of the long range of their eight- and ten-inch guns,
which could fire almost as far as the twelve-inch guns of the remaining four battle-
ships. This purchase allowed the Imperial Japanese Navy to maintain its in-
tended “six-six fleet” throughout the war.
JAPANESE STRATEGY AND POLICY
In late 1903 Supreme Headquarters (the Combined Staff Office of the Imperial
Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy) and the Japanese government,
working together, made an estimate of the current situation and identified sev-
eral advantages that Japan could use in its strategy.
Elements of the Japanese Estimate and Strategy
First, revolutionary factions in Russia were generating serious domestic instabil-
ity. There was no national consensus in Russia for war against Japan. The Japa-
nese strategy to exploit this weakness was to support Russian revolutionary
groups. The government decided to send a special mission to Europe to conduct
activities supportive to the Russian revolutionary groups.9
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A second Japanese advantage was that Russia could not fully concentrate its
army in the Far East because it had to keep some forces in western Russia as a
counter to Turkish, German, and Austrian forces. That meant that by concen-
trating most of the Imperial Army in Manchuria, the Japanese could field an
army with strength equal to that of the Russian force it faced there. Further, the
goal of that army was less to win than not to lose. Meanwhile, a third party, prob-
ably the United States, would be asked to mediate a peace before the war became
prolonged enough for Russian reinforcements to arrive from Europe.
At sea, the Japanese Combined Fleet was slightly superior to the Russian Pa-
cific Fleet. But the true Japanese advantage was the fact that Russia had to divide
the Pacific Fleet into two forces, one at Port Arthur and the other at Vladivostok.
In addition, most reinforcements from Europe would have to take the long route
around the Cape of Good
Hope, along which few ports
would be available to them, be-
cause of British diplomatic
pressure on other nations, in-
cluding France. The Japanese
strategy was therefore to con-
centrate its fleet and engage di-
vided Russian forces separately.
Japan badly needed to secure its sea line of communication to Manchuria, the
lifeline of the Japanese army there. In addition, the Japanese government under-
took to encourage Britain to exercise fully its influence to ensure that no third
parties supported a Russian reinforcement from Europe.
The fourth Japanese advantage was that the Trans-Siberian Railway was a
single-track line and not fully complete. The Russian lines of communication,
from European Russia to the Far East and within the Manchurian plain, would
be extremely long, difficult to maintain, and of limited capacity. The Japanese
strategy was to hit and destroy the Russian field army in Manchuria before its lo-
gistic network became fully functional. Interestingly, the Japanese leaders fully
recognized that they had a similar problem and that accordingly the Japanese
army there could not afford to drive the Russian army too fast or too deep into
Manchuria, even in an advantageous situation. Further, the Japanese leaders
planned to employ a cavalry battalion to disrupt the Russian rear area.
Finally, the Russian army was too cumbersome and unwieldy to wage the
warfare of maneuver that the vast expanse of the Manchurian plain required.
The Russian formations—too large in size, their training inadequate, and their
communication poor—could not conduct coordinated mobile operations and
night engagements. The Japanese response was, first, to organize and employ
2 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
IJN Fleet Russian Pacific Fleet
Port Arthur Vladivostok Others
Battleships 6 7
Armored Cruisers 6 1 3
Cruisers 12 4 1 2
Destroyers 22 21
Torpedo Boats 28 7 15
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army corps of only “adequate size,” two or three divisions, with maximum mo-
bility, and use them in a way that took maximum advantage of relative Russian
immobility and poor communication. Second, the Japanese soldiers were
trained specifically for night engagements.
“Sixty-Forty Reconciliation”
The operations planning room in the General Staff Office in Tokyo was already
looking ahead to advantageous war termination. Public opinion in Japan sup-
ported a war of revenge against Russia, but the leaders of the government and
military were still prudent and careful in their analysis. As we have seen, their
general consensus was that Japan could not win outright but might be able to
bring the war to a draw or even to a situation that was slightly advantageous to
Japan—a possibility they called a “sixty-forty reconciliation.” If this was to oc-
cur, several conditions had to be fulfilled.
First, the Japanese army would have to establish superiority over the Russian
army in Manchuria. This seemed to be the most difficult requirement, because
of the shortage of strategic reserves, an insufficient stockpile of ammunition,
and poor field heavy artillery. Well thought out operational plans and effective
tactics on the battlefield were therefore considered the keys to making up, at
least partly, for the underlying Japanese handicaps. Indeed, the Japanese leaders
had confidence in the soundness of their operational plans, based as they were
on superior strategy, and in the hard discipline of their soldiers.
Second, it was essential for the Combined Fleet to destroy the Pacific Fleet be-
fore the arrival of Russian naval reinforcements from Europe. Further, it was
necessary in the meantime for Admiral Togo to preserve his strength, to ensure
that he had a fleet capable of destroying the reinforcements when they arrived.
The government and military leaders were convinced that both goals, though
difficult, were achievable if the Imperial Navy wisely and carefully executed its
tailored operational plans.
Third, Japan—a newly rising and still poor nation—would have to guarantee,
before a decision to go to war, that it had sufficient funds to meet a vast wartime
expenditure. The Anglo-Japanese alliance proved favorable here, enabling Japan
to raise capital in several countries. Additionally, Japanese economic leaders
agreed to support fully the national war effort. These factors convinced the gov-
ernment that a war would be at least barely affordable.
Finally, to bring the war to an end, Japan required the cooperation of the
United States. Washington, it was hoped, would mediate the dispute at a time
that would be advantageous to Japan. The government decided to send a special
envoy, Kentaro Kaneko, who was a member of the House of Peers in the Imperial
Diet and an old acquaintance of the U.S. president, Theodore Roosevelt. His
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mission was to convince the president to support Japan and, at the same time, to
elicit American public support for Japan, so the U.S. government would be will-
ing to mediate.
FINAL DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
Notwithstanding its advantages and strategy, the Japanese government felt that
the risks of war were still too large, that hostilities against giant Russia should be
undertaken only as a last resort. The government pursued every possibility, no
matter how small, of achieving a settlement. In the face of the fait accompli of a
forcible Russian military presence in Manchuria, Tokyo decided to start diplo-
matic negotiations with Russia, and by 23 June 1903 it had developed a basic ne-
gotiating policy. A key point was that the two countries would mutually accept
Russian rights in Manchuria and Japanese rights on the Korean Peninsula. The
rationale was that if Japan was to protect its national sovereignty from Russian
pressure in the long term, the Korean Peninsula had to be kept outside of any
Russian influence, a buffer zone between Russia and Japan. This proposal was
officially passed to the Russian government on 12 August.
Thereafter, despite repeated requests for an answer, the Russian government
kept silent for almost two months, finally responding to Japan on 3 October. The
answer was far different from the proposal and disappointing to the Japanese
government. Russia made a counterproposal that mentioned nothing about
Manchuria but imposed a total ban on military use of the Korean Peninsula, es-
tablishing a neutral zone in the peninsula above thirty-nine degrees north lati-
tude and banning fortifications along its coasts.
The Japanese government was patient enough to propose on 30 October an
amendment, to establish a neutral zone thirty miles wide on either side of the
border between Korea and Manchuria. The Russian response, presented almost
a month afterward, was basically the same as its first answer.
To the Japanese government, this new Russian position was quite uncomfort-
able and unreliable. However, on 21 December it again offered a compromise,
removing the ban on military use of the Korean Peninsula but establishing a
neutral zone. The Russian answer, which was brought to the Japanese govern-
ment on 6 January 1904, was again almost the same as the initial offer, with mi-
nor modifications. Again, and particularly disappointing to Japan, the Russians
made no mention of Manchuria.
At this point the Japanese leaders came to the conclusion that the Russian
government had no intention of settling the dispute on the Manchuria and Ko-
rean Peninsula issues. Instead, the Russians had merely drawn Japan along, buy-
ing time for a military buildup in Manchuria, for intimidation and warfare. The
Japanese leaders, dejected at the failure of their diplomatic efforts, became
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inclined to go to war. But on 12 January the Meiji emperor directed the leader-
ship to make one last effort for peace. In full compliance with the emperor’s di-
rective, on 16 January 1904 the government issued a note verbale to the Russian
government requesting resumption of the negotiations; it was completely ig-
nored. Furthermore, progress in Russian military preparations in Manchuria
and at Port Arthur was reported. To the Japanese government, this meant that
the more time Japan spent in diplomacy, the more difficult would be the military
position it would eventually face. The diplomatic effort to reach a compromise
with Russia had ended in failure.10
In parallel with the fruitless six-month-long diplomatic effort, Japan’s leaders
had assessed their national power and compared it with that of Russia. They
made a dispassionate review, ignoring the public anti-Russian feelings and in-
stead counting guns and warships, estimating expenditures, and analyzing Rus-
sia’s overall situation. In their view the gap was too large to make up, but they
became convinced that all their goals for war would be satisfied if they managed
to steer Japanese strategy and policy well, integrating everything necessary and
taking all possible factors into account. On 4 February 1904, the government de-
cided to go to war against Russia.
Diplomatic relations were officially broken on 6 February 1904, and this fact
was conveyed to the Russian foreign minister in St. Petersburg (then the capital)
the same day. War was officially declared on 10 February 1904 by the govern-
ment of Japan, in the name of the Meiji emperor.
CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES
While it is not the main objective of this article to examine all the engagements
of this war, there are, aside from Tsushima, two battles worth discussing in some
detail: the campaign at Port Arthur and the Battle of the Yellow Sea (10 August
1904). First, however, a short review of the general concept of operations is
necessary.
Order of Battle of Japanese Forces and Their Concept of Operations
Japanese military leaders coordinated the development of a cooperative, inte-
grated plan by the Army and Navy, in which the roles for each were clearly de-
fined and assigned.
The Imperial Army’s operations in the Russo-Japanese War were envisioned
in two phases, the first lasting through the autumn of 1904 (see map 4). The Jap-
anese First Army was to land at Inchon, on the Korean Peninsula, and then pro-
ceed to Manchuria. The Second Army was to land on the southern coast of the
Liaotung Peninsula and likewise move toward Manchuria, coordinating with
the advance of the First Army. The Third Army was to land on and secure the
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Liaotung Peninsula, then capture Port Arthur. The Fourth Army was to land on
the northeastern coast of Po-Hai Bay and proceed to Liaoyang, coordinating
with the Second Army. The General Staff of the Army in Tokyo estimated that
large-scale winter operations would be difficult due to severe weather condi-
tions. All the armies were in late autumn to bivouac for the winter of 1904–1905,
north of Liaoyang.
Phase Two was to begin in the early spring of 1905 and extend to the end of
the war. In this phase, the four armies were to combine and concentrate for bat-
tle with the Russian main force.
As for the Imperial Navy, the fleet had two missions. The first was to destroy
the Russian Pacific Fleet and secure the seas around Japan. The main Russian na-
val force was the East Asian Squadron, at Port Arthur; a second force was at
Vladivostok. The second mission was to support the landings of Army forces on
the Korean and Liaotung peninsulas. The Navy organized the Combined Fleet to
bring this plan to fruition. The Combined Fleet comprised the First Fleet (six
battleships and a cruiser force) and the Second Fleet (six armored cruisers plus
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other escorting cruisers). The General Staff of the Navy tasked the various parts
of the Combined Fleet to destroy the divided Pacific Fleet. The First Fleet was to
take the Russian Port Arthur squadron; the Second Fleet’s target was the
Vladivostok force. In addition there was the Third Fleet (not part of the Com-
bined Fleet), composed of cruisers and coastal defense ships; this the General
Staff of the Navy assigned to escort Japanese shipping and support landing oper-
ations of the Army.11
The Port Arthur Campaign
The expected naval reinforcements from Europe—in the form of the Baltic
Fleet, under Admiral Zinovi Petrovich Rozhdestvenski—was known to be pre-
paring for its voyage to the Far East (which it actually began on 15 October
1904). Japan needed to engage and destroy the divided Pacific Fleet before the
Baltic Fleet could arrive. The Combined Fleet chose as its primary target in the
first phase of the war the East Asian Squadron at Port Arthur. Its total destruc-
tion would have significance for the Army, in that it would guarantee the secu-
rity of sea lines of communication from Japan to Korea and China, which, as
noted, were vital to the Imperial Army operations in Manchuria.
Imperial Navy Operations during the Port Arthur Campaign. The Combined Fleet
was tasked with the destruction or neutralization of the Russian squadron at the
earliest opportunity. It was considered imperative that this be completed early,
so repairs and training could be accomplished before the arrival of the Russian
Baltic Fleet. The Combined Fleet developed three alternative strategies. The first
was a night torpedo assault by destroyers, to be carried out if the Russians stayed
in the outer portion of Port Arthur. The second was a blockade of the port, by
sinking ships or laying mines in the channel at the entrance of the harbor.12 The
last strategy was indirect naval gunfire from outside the reach of Russian coastal
artillery, to lure the Russian squadron into a fleet engagement in the Yellow Sea.
Whatever the merits of these three strategies, Admiral Togo’s tactical execu-
tion of them was rather poor and inadequate, and the results proved insufficient.
Despite the dedication of his sailors, Togo failed to complete his assigned mis-
sions during the first three months of the war. Worse, Togo’s fleet also suffered
serious casualties, which was considered the last thing he could afford to do,
with the Baltic Fleet soon to be on the way. Recognizing that he had a problem,
Admiral Togo asked Admiral Sukeyuki Ito, Chief of Naval Staff in Tokyo and in a
position to coordinate closely with the Army General Staff and government, to
reinforce the Third Army against Port Arthur. The leaders in Tokyo met imme-
diately and issued orders to provide the necessary support for the ground cam-
paign against Port Arthur.
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Imperial Army Operations during the Port Arthur Campaign. The Imperial Army
tasked General Maresuke Nogi’s Third Army to isolate, attack, and take the
well-protected fortress of Port Arthur (see map 5). Nogi’s army started its cam-
paign on 26 June 1904, employing simple infantry assault tactics against the for-
tified defensive line that the Russians had built up in the surrounding
mountains and hills. Unfortunately, General Nogi continuously repeated these
brutal tactics, making his infantrymen easy targets for the Russian defenders,
whose carefully prepared positions allowed a continual cross fire.
Due to the inflexibility of General Nogi and his staff officers, and to their
overconfidence in the fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier, which was a long
tradition of samurai, the Third Army suffered a tremendous loss of young sol-
diers—who, if properly employed, would have been precious as reinforcements
during the last ground campaign, around Mukden, in March 1905. Nonetheless,
the Third Army eventually conquered a key hill overlooking the harbor of Port
Arthur from which Japanese heavy artillery was able to bombard Russian ships
and base facilities. Shelling started on 7 August, inflicting substantial damage to
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facilities, personnel, and ships. By that time, all of the Liaotung Peninsula had
been taken by the Second Army, completely isolating Port Arthur.
A new concern now arose in the Japanese General Staff—the possibility of an
escape attempt by the Russian naval squadron in Port Arthur. Japanese war
planners did not want the squadron to join the remainder of the Pacific Fleet at
Vladivostok.
The Outcome of the Port Arthur Campaign. The Japanese Army and Navy coor-
dinated well, and in the end they attained their military objectives. Admiral Togo
learned from his early mistakes and corrected them. One area of weakness that
was uncovered was low levels of skill and inadequacy of tactics in the destroyer
force; another was ineffectiveness of fleet gunnery. One underlying reason could
be that Japanese sailors were being called upon to fight the world’s first modern
sea engagement, using state-of-the-art equipment and newly developed tactics
with which they were not totally familiar. Most of the senior officers and petty
officers were veterans of the Sino-Japanese War of ten years before; however,
even they had not fully caught up with the new and unknown challenges of
modern naval warfare. For their part, Admiral Togo and his staff officers were
learning “on the job” how to employ their assets properly.
On the Army side, the loss of tens of thousands of soldiers in General Nogi’s
badly managed battles seriously affected other operations in Manchuria and
generated grave concern. The Japanese leadership feared the possible loss of the
whole Third Army, which they had counted on to reinforce the other three ar-
mies, now already in Manchuria. It was a last-minute change of tactics from un-
supported infantry assault to a combination of infantry assault and artillery
barrage, as well as the capture of positions suitable for shelling, that saved the
Third Army.
This change does not excuse General Nogi’s initial mistake. Having said this,
however, we must note General Nogi’s superb leadership. History shows that in
cases of serious operational failure and incredibly high casualties caused by poor
command, most generals lose the support and loyalty of their soldiers. This in
turn brings final collapse and, for the general, disgrace. But General Nogi’s sol-
diers never lost their trust in him or their loyalty to the nation and their army.
Something in his leadership that is difficult to identify today strongly appealed
to his soldiers. One reason might have been that General Nogi lost both his sons
during the campaign—meaning the extinction of the family line, the most im-
portant social value of that period—but asked for no special treatment. More-
over, one of the most important points here is that many Japanese fathers and
mothers shared the same kind of mental pain at this time.
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The Battle of the Yellow Sea, 10 August 1904
As the Combined Fleet attempted to block Port Arthur and the Second and the
Third Armies progressively isolated and began to attack the port, the commander
of the Russian naval squadron became increasingly worried (see map 6).
In addition to continuing attempts to lure out and engage the Russian squad-
ron, the Japanese fleet tried three times to bottle it up inside Port Arthur—on 24
February, 27 March, and 3 May—by sinking ships at the mouth of the harbor.
These attempts were not fully successful and Admiral Togo suffered some vital
losses in the process, but the operations imposed an emotional drain on the Rus-
sian sailors. Meanwhile, the Third Army had landed on the Liaotung Peninsula,
on 6 June, and the Second Army was isolating the peninsula. These army opera-
tions too caused serious psychological stress for the Russian leaders, whose
nightmare was, of course, the complete closure of the port by land and sea.
On 23 June, Admiral Togo got the chance he had awaited so long; the Russian
squadron attempted an escape from the port. However, after brief contact be-
tween the two forces, the Russians quickly reversed course and headed back
to the port. Togo was unable to bring on a traditional fleet engagement; the
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Russians’ sudden turning back was far different from his expectation and quite
disappointing.
When the Third Army seized the heights and, on 7 August, shelling began, the
Russian Navy General Staff ordered the squadron to leave Port Arthur and join
the Vladivostok force. It sailed on 10 August. When Admiral Togo received the
report of the Russian sortie, he quickly reacted, believing it to be the best, but
maybe last, opportunity to destroy the enemy fleet. With his First and Third
Fleets Togo eagerly engaged the enemy fleet of six battleships and four cruisers.
The first engagement of the day took place in the early afternoon. Togo saw
two objectives: one was to destroy the enemy fleet; the second was, if the first was
not successful, to prevent the enemy’s return to Port Arthur, as had been allowed
to happen on 23 June. Determined not to repeat that experience, he now used all
means to prevent a Russian retreat to Port Arthur. The result was that Togo, not
having decided on a single course of action, attempted to pursue both objectives
and so maneuvered his fleet poorly. This time the Russian squadron concen-
trated all of its efforts on escaping; Admiral Togo, too focused on cutting off a re-
treat, was outfoxed again and almost allowed the enemy fleet to get away.
Additionally, his fleet engaged the enemy (at 1:30 in the afternoon) at such long
range, about eleven thousand yards, that his guns were ineffective. Togo at about
3:30 ordered his fleet to cease firing and started to close the distance.
Two hours later a second engagement started at a distance of about seven
thousand yards. The second engagement lasted for about three hours. At about
6:30 one, or maybe two, shells from Japanese warships hit the bridge and ar-
mored conning tower of the Russian flagship, Tsesarevich, killing the squadron
commander, Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft, and severely wounding the ship’s com-
manding officer. The hit, destroying the Russian command structure, caused
confusion within the Russian squadron, which now scattered.
A follow-on torpedo assault by Japanese destroyers and torpedo boats against
the surviving Russian warships was badly executed and gained no success. The
remnants of the squadron escaped—although they never reached Vladivostok
or joined the forces there.13 Thus, the main Russian naval force in the Far East,
the Port Arthur squadron, was totally incapacitated.
The Battle of Ulsan
The Vladivostok force of three armored cruisers—Rossiya, Gromoboi, and
Rurik—sortied on 12 August, not knowing the result of the battle involving the
Port Arthur squadron (see map 7). The Japanese Second Fleet, which had been
assigned to fight the Vladivostok force, had moved, upon notification of the sail-
ing of the Port Arthur squadron two days before, and had taken station near the
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Tsushima Strait, a choke point where it could intercept either Russian group. On
the morning of 14 August, the Japanese Second Fleet and Russian Vladivostok
force encountered each other east of Tsushima Strait, off Ulsan, Korea. The
Vladivostok force was destroyed, never to revive for the rest of the war.
By December 1904, the Russian Pacific Fleet was completely disabled, allow-
ing Admiral Togo to bring his fleet back to Japan for rest, maintenance, and
training. Port Arthur was occupied by General Nogi on 2 January 1905.
THE TSUSHIMA STRAIT
If the conduct of Admiral Togo in the Battle of the Yellow Sea was flawed, he
faced a serious dilemma—the Pacific Fleet was only one of two Russian fleets
that he must fight with his single Combined Fleet. The basic strategy of Japan
was to destroy both Russian fleets, one after the other.
Lessons Learned by Admiral Togo
In the spring and summer of 1904, while Admiral Togo was facing the first set of
strong enemy forces, the second force, the formidable Baltic Fleet, was preparing
to leave European Russia. Every Japanese sailor—every Japanese citizen, for that
matter—knew that it was impossible to replace even a single major combatant
in the time the war was expected to last. Togo, then, had the nearly impossible
task of sweeping away the Russian Pacific Fleet at the earliest opportunity, while
avoiding the loss of any of his major ships. However, in May 1904 he lost two
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battleships to Russian mines near Port Arthur. It was this loss that, luckily for
Togo and Japan, was followed by the arrival, just in time, of the two armored
cruisers purchased from Argentina.
It is easy to imagine the psychological pressure upon Togo at the Battle of the
Yellow Sea, just over a hundred years ago. He could have fought the battle at
closer range to guarantee victory, but it would have increased the risk of damage
and losses. This fear of losing battleships probably dominated the tactical think-
ing of Admiral Togo and his staff, and therefore became one of the reasons for
his ineffective gunnery and maneuver during the Battle of the Yellow Sea.
This factor also drove Togo to reemphasize torpedo attack. Though he knew it
would result in losses to his small destroyers or torpedo boats, these losses,
though serious, could possibly be absorbed because of the relatively large num-
ber of these smaller warships. In addition, the ability of torpedoes, if they hit, to
inflict serious damage on enemy warships was also attractive to Togo. So it was
understandable that Togo expected much from his torpedo tactics, but the real-
ity was that they were unsuccessful in the Yellow Sea battle.
If, generally speaking, Admiral Togo’s tactics in the Battle of the Yellow Sea
were questionable, what he won was significant. Further, from the Japanese
navy’s point of view, several aspects of the battle strongly influenced the result of
the Battle of Tsushima and the final outcome of the war.
First, although Admiral Togo did not completely destroy the enemy fleet by
gunfire, the end result fully met the strategic objectives of Japan. That is, the Jap-
anese destroyed the Russian Pacific Fleet well before the arrival of the Baltic
Fleet, which departed European Russia only in October.
Second, the Imperial Navy was able to send the main force of the Combined
Fleet back to Japan for refit. The Combined Fleet took the opportunity to incor-
porate the lessons learned throughout all the naval operations and engagements
in the war to date. Admiral Togo personally used the time to assess the previous
naval campaigns and prepare for the coming battle against the Baltic Fleet.
Togo’s assessment revealed that, third and most important, he was now freed
from his dilemma completely—Togo was no longer required to destroy a fleet
without losing any ships. He started full-scale preparations for the coming battle
against the Russian Baltic Fleet.
A Practical Combat Concept
Admiral Togo, of course, developed before the war many combat concepts, in-
cluding an operational doctrine (Sen-Saku), an operations plan (Sakusen-
Keikaku), and tactics. In general they were well conceived by his staff officers, but
they were not yet combat proven.
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At the Battle of the Yellow Sea, Togo applied these doctrines, plans, and tac-
tics. However, the Japanese navy’s original and overall combat concept of opera-
tions was flawed, in that it did not envision that the Combined Fleet would
conduct “reactive” engagements (as actually happened). Rather, the concept of
operations had assumed an ideal and traditional head-on engagement between
two fleets. In the Yellow Sea battle, because of his ongoing blockade operations,
Admiral Togo was not fully prepared for the sudden sortie of the Russian squadron
out of Port Arthur; therefore, he simply had to react to it. The concept of opera-
tions was, maybe, not bad in theory, but some of its elements were too sophisti-
cated and theoretical to execute in a confused battle environment—too difficult
even for combat-experienced officers and sailors of the Combined Fleet. Indeed,
there was a gap between the envisioned concept of operations and actual execution
in the battle, a gap that made the position of Admiral Togo very difficult.
Togo recognized the necessity of filling this gap and strongly felt the need to
tailor a concept of operations with no such gap for the upcoming fight against
the Baltic Fleet. Admiral Togo directed Saneyuki Akiyama, an operations officer,
to develop a detailed and practical concept of operations that was suited to the
level of expertise of Japanese officers and sailors. Togo issued a new operational
doctrine, the centerpiece of his new concept, on 12 April 1905, and he made sure
that all the commanders and commanding officers clearly understood it.
A distinctive feature of the new concept of operations was “engagement in
depth.”14 What Togo meant by this was the complete destruction of the Baltic
Fleet by repeated attacks. This was the operational goal to which Akiyama de-
voted all his energy, and it was one of the real roots of the Japanese success at the
Battle of Tsushima. Several main elements supported the new doctrine.
The Competence of Gunners and Spotters.A core tenet of the operational doctrine
of the Combined Fleet had been gun engagement between main forces—the
battleships and armored cruisers. Specifically, the battleship force (the 1st Squad-
ron) was to concentrate its fire on the leading ship, presumably the flagship, of the
enemy’s main force at the very outset of an engagement. In that way Admiral
Togo intended to take an advantageous position over the enemy fleet, but at the
Battle of the Yellow Sea, due to poor fleet handling Togo failed to comply with this
doctrine, and as a result the doctrine itself was nothing but pie in the sky.
Admiral Togo understood that his maneuvering and long-range gun engage-
ment at the Battle of the Yellow Sea had been inadequate, and he tried to develop
all possible solutions that would address the lessons he had learned. In that connec-
tion, he ensured that his officers, gunners, and spotters were thoroughly retrained.
Specifically, Togo tried to implement a new fire-control concept that
switched from independent firing of each turret to controlled firing of all guns.
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Through the Battle of the Yellow Sea, after “open fire” was ordered, each spotter
fired his gun at his own discretion at the target designated by the gunnery officer.
The essence of the new concept was that, first, the target and firing range were
determined by a gunnery officer on the bridge; the spotters of all guns set their
sights on the same chosen target, at the designated range. When all the guns
were ready, they simultaneously fired at the same target on order from the gun-
nery officer. He alone observed the impacts and the fall of shot, and made cor-
rections and adjustments. Each gunnery team was trained to repeat these
procedures until they became automatic and routine. This new firing proce-
dure, combined with upgrades in guns and range-finding equipment, which
had broken down several times at the Battle of the Yellow Sea, produced real
improvements in the gun-engagement capability of Admiral Togo’s fleet.15
Fully understanding that the competence of his gunnery officers, gunners,
and spotters was the key to success in the coming battle, Togo dedicated every-
thing to improving and strengthening their training. He never made any com-
promise but strictly imposed practical discipline on these specialists.
Basic Formations for Gun Engagements. Another lesson that Admiral Togo
learned from the Battle of the Yellow Sea was that overly complicated maneuvers
caused the failure of long-range engagements. At the beginning of the battle, the
forces under Togo were scattered around the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea,
and he quickly tried to assemble them; however, they joined the battle separately,
one after another, and fought independently. This very much complicated his
command over the force as a whole. Admiral Togo now decided to concentrate
all of his Combined Fleet in the theater and task each force in compliance with
the new operational doctrine and plan. In addition, he chose to fight at shorter
range, seven to eight thousand yards or less. He also decided to employ a “single
line” formation as the basic gunnery disposition.
Togo also made the coordination between his two main forces clearer. The
First Fleet was first to concentrate its firepower on the enemy flagship in order to
gain an initial advantage. The First and Second Fleets together were then to co-
ordinate and make “repeated” attacks on the remainder of the enemy’s main
force until it was totally destroyed.
Torpedo Employment. As we have seen, and contrary to the expectation of Ad-
miral Togo, torpedo attacks had achieved poor results in blockade operations
outside Port Arthur. They also exposed inadequacies during the engagements on
23 June and 10 August.
The torpedo, because of its capability of inflicting a blow beneath the water-
line and so causing serious flooding, was considered an effective and sometimes
a lethal weapon—even against well-protected ships, such as battleships and
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armored ships. That was the torpedo capability for which the Imperial Japanese
Navy strove. But the actual use of torpedoes at sea, especially during combat op-
erations, was much more difficult than the theory stated in the doctrine sug-
gested. There were two main reasons.
One was that Japanese tactics for torpedo attack were not well developed. For
example, some vital elements—target designation, types of engagement (day or
night), attack formation and speed, firing range, etc.—were not well defined. In
other words, there was no unified concept or standard procedure for torpedo at-
tacks. Torpedo attacks were simply left to each independent commander and
commanding officers of units.
The second was that the technology was immature, and torpedo systems on
the ships were poor. For example, there was no ranging gear to determine firing
distance. In practice, on these very small destroyers and craft, ranging was done
by the “Mark 1 eyeball” of experienced officers. Additionally, some torpedoes
misfired or failed to run straight.
Togo directed his officers to develop the best possible torpedo tactics, ap-
proaches that reflected all the lessons of the first six months of the war. All possi-
ble corrective actions were taken to improve torpedo equipment on the
launching ships. The torpedomen, like the gunnery teams, were thoroughly re-
trained until they became solid, combat-ready teams. In addition, in conjunc-
tion with a reshuffling of major staffs and commanders on 12 January 1905,
Togo changed the commanders of all five destroyer divisions. The admiral now
had full confidence in his torpedo forces and their engagement capability.16
These were to be real, if hidden, reasons for the Japanese success at the Battle
of Tsushima. In other words, without the Battle of the Yellow Sea, which was al-
most no victory at all, Admiral Togo probably would have gone into the
Tsushima battle without thorough preparations—without the best concept of
operations, doctrine, or plan, and without the best tactics or fully trained forces
and sailors. If that had been the case, the result at Tsushima, the decisive battle
between Admirals Togo and Rozhdestvenski, might have been completely differ-
ent. So it can be said that for all intents and purposes, the stage for success at
Tsushima was set at this time. Togo had an almost 90 percent chance of success at
Tsushima before the battle started. The remaining 10 percent was left to Togo
and his determination to execute the plan within a real combat environment,
where fear, uncertainty, and the unexpected can overwhelm the “weak human.”
Ten percent seems small, but this determination is the most important factor in
the ability of any combat commander to win a battle. For the Imperial Navy and
Japan, it was fortunate indeed that Togo truly had this strong will and could sus-
tain it in any situation on the battlefield.
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ENDING THE WAR: WALKING A TIGHTROPE
The Japanese strategy at this point in the war was on a high wire: if Japan mis-
calculated, the result would be devastating. Prior to the war, the Japanese leader-
ship had drawn up a single war plan. It was believed to be the only possible
course of action, because the weak and nascent state of Japanese national power
did not seem to allow any alternatives. As we have seen, Japan intended to take
full advantage of the slow reaction of the Russian giant in a series of quick
strikes, showing Japanese superiority to the world. Before the giant could make a
full-scale counterattack, Japan would ask for mediation by a neutral party, the
United States, and thereby obtain a favorable settlement. Initial, local Japanese
military superiority over Russia was believed to be the key to building worldwide
credibility, which was expected, in turn, to facilitate foreign loans to cover war
expenditures and, at the same time, convince the American government and
people to mediate.
But if Japan missed any one of these steps, the strategy could instantly fall from
the wire; the nation would lose the war and be ruined. Understanding the risk this
plan entailed, Japan managed with great difficulty to integrate its national war
efforts, both diplomatic and military strategies, into one goal, the advantageous
“sixty-forty” reconciliation. The Japanese leaders did not think the country
could win a full victory over Russia, only achieve favorable war termination.
The level of coordination within the government, as well as between political
and military branches, was matchless. In particular, the high quality of planning,
resolve to execute plans, sound management of military campaigns, and the
bravery of Japanese soldiers were characteristic of Japan’s success in this war.
Russia, in contrast, failed. The Russians overestimated their own power, ig-
nored that of Japan, and provoked the Japanese people—whom many Russians,
particularly Tsar Nicholas II, called “Asian small yellow monkeys.” They did not
study Japan or the Japanese people carefully. Because of the significant differ-
ence of power between the two nations, the Russians even thought that Japan
would never opt for war, whatever the Japanese security concern was. Without
sufficient knowledge of Japan, they first optimistically thought that war was not
possible for Japan; even in case of war, they felt, they could knock down the weak
and barbarous Japanese forces at the first blow. The provoked and angry Japa-
nese showed the baselessness of this thinking.
Even after the war broke out, St. Petersburg considered it a sideshow, a matter
for the local authority in the Far East. The Russians in the region had no inte-
grated grand strategy based on correct information about Japan. What the local
Russian forces, commanded by General A. N. Kuropatkin, intended was simply
to slaughter the Japanese army with overwhelming forces early in the war. But
the Japanese fought desperately on every battlefield and defied the estimates of
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the Russians. As they accumulated more combat experience against the Japanese
military—at Liaoyang (August–September 1904), Shaho (October 1904), and
Hei-Kou-Tai (January 1905)—the Russians realized that the Japanese might be a
different enemy than they had thought.
General Kuropatkin now tried the traditional Russian military strategy that
had been used against Napoleon. The intent was to withdraw, lure the enemy
deep into an area where Russia had the advantage, build up their forces, and then
deliver a fatal blow with overwhelming troop strength. If the Russian army had
properly executed this strategy, the Japanese army in Manchuria might have
been annihilated. Particularly at the Battle of Mukden, and despite an
3 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Liaoyang. This was the first head-on ground engagement. The Japanese
army of about 134,000, commanded by General Iwao Oyama, contained all
available forces other than the Third Army, which was at Port Arthur. The Rus-
sian army, commanded by General A. N. Kuropatkin, was about 225,000
strong. Both sides expected to deliver fatal blows. Fighting started on 30 Au-
gust 1904 and ended on 3 September in the retreat of the Russian forces. The
Russians outnumbered the Japanese but fought with less spirit and skill. The
Russian retreat put the Japanese force in an advantageous position, but the
victory was far from decisive. This first battle exposed the Japanese Achilles’
heel—poor logistic capability and insufficient reserves—which prevented pur-
suit and destruction of the retreating enemy.
Shaho. As the situation became increasing unfavorable to the Russians,
the tsar became determined to save both Port Arthur and, more importantly,
face for the Russian Empire. He directed General Kuropatkin to reverse the
tide of the war. General Kuropatkin duly attacked the Japanese in over-
whelming force at Shaho, but an unexpected and fierce Japanese counter-
attack pushed the Russians back. If Kuropatkin had had the indomitable spirit
necessary to carry on regardless of casualties and operational inertia, he could
have smashed the Japanese force. But he did not, and his attack failed.
Hei-Kou-Tai. After the Battle of Shaho, the two forces faced each other
until the frozen Manchurian winter began. The Japanese field commanders
thought no major battle was possible and assumed that the Russians had the
same view of the difficulty of winter combat. However, General
Oskar-Ferdinand Kazimirovich Grippenberg, the newly arrived commanding
general of the Russian Second Army, quickly grasped the operational center
of gravity—the Japanese left wing, which jutted northward into Russian terri-
tory at Hei-Kou-Tai. Against the strong opposition of Kuropatkin,
Grippenberg planned and executed the attack with firm determination. The
Japanese forces, ”hibernating” in winter quarters, were completely sur-
prised. Their command chain lost coherence, and some forces fell into help-
less chaos. The uncoordinated Japanese forces were almost defeated. But
units and individual soldiers did not give up, striking back fiercely and instinc-
tively against the enemies in front of them. They restored, barely, the front in
a series of independent engagements.
Suddenly the Russian Second Army was ordered to stop attacking. The ad-
vancing Russian soldiers, their morale extremely high because they knew they
were winning, could not understand the reason. The answer was the jealousy
of a legendary military leader, General Kuropatkin. The Japanese forces were
again saved by the Russian leadership—not, this time, by irresolution but by a
truly scandalous discord. (See Yoichi Hirama, Nichi-Ro Senso ga kaeta sekaishi
[World history changed by the Russo-Japanese War] [Tokyo: Fuyo-
Shobo-Shuppan].)
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advantageous tactical situation, the Japanese supply line was stretched almost to
the breaking point. Force strength and the logistical stocks were precariously
low in the field. The situation was the same in Japan itself.
If the Russian leaders, particularly Kuropatkin and his successor, had had a
firm resolve to execute the plan, the Russian forces could have smashed the Japa-
nese. But they did not. Unlike that of the Japanese leaders, their resolve was
weak, and this weakness itself led the nation and its army to failure in this war. To
be sure, for Russian leaders failure would not mean the collapse of Great Russia;
for them the war against Japan was just an affair in the distant Far East. But for
Japan, the war was a matter of the life or death of the nation and its people. Japan,
particularly the Japanese army, was saved by this fatal flaw in the Russian leader-
ship of those years.
After the Battle of Mukden in February–March 1905, Japanese leaders, de-
spite their victory and seizure of the capital of Manchuria, knew they could not
continue combat. Due to the lack of combat-ready reserves, ammunition, and
supplies, the Japanese force could not hit and sweep away the retreating Rus-
sians. The Japanese, knowing they were losing the chance of a lifetime, could
only witness the escape of the helpless Russian units. There was no hope that Ja-
pan could recover quickly from this state of exhaustion; this was the consensus
from the lowest to the highest in the field and among the leaders in Tokyo.
The Russians, however, though they accepted that their position was now un-
favorable and tactically disadvantageous, knew that they were still strong
enough to fight another large battle—and that Japan could not afford to. Partic-
ularly, they pinned their hopes on the Baltic Fleet, which was expected to arrive
in Japanese waters soon. If it destroyed the Japanese fleet and gained control of
the sea, it would shut off supplies to the already starving Japanese army. That
would mean, the Russians were confident, victory.
Thus, the battle between the Japanese Combined Fleet and the Russian Baltic
Fleet was to be crucial for both countries. If Japan was to maintain its advanta-
geous position in Manchuria and save its army, it had to win the battle utterly.
Russia had to do the same to save its own forces in Manchuria. This is the real
meaning of the Battle of Tsushima—a battle that, as we have seen, Admiral Togo
had 90 percent won before it started.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR IMPERIAL JAPAN
By the 1930s, the Japanese leadership no longer looked back to the efforts of
their predecessors in the Meiji era and did not consider the lessons learned and
taught by their seniors who had managed the Russo-Japanese War successfully.
Of course, the leaders in the Showa era thought they were taking due account of
the past, but their conduct showed that in fact they were just skimming through
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the old lessons, never digging into the true nature of the experience gained at
such cost.17 We can readily point out a number of sharp contrasts between the
leadership in the Meiji era and that in the first twenty years (1926–45) of Showa.
Public Consensus. Meiji leaders achieved near unanimity of public opinion by
making full use of the Triple Intervention. Showa leaders, however, managed
poorly the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 and the series of incidents
in China that followed. This ten-year-long military episode in Manchuria and
China gravely shook Japanese morale. Ordinary Japanese people were still
strongly loyal to the country, but they also had a gloomy sense of never-ending
“quagmires” in China. In addition to this, many were revolted by a series of taw-
dry power games in Tokyo. The Japanese people in Showa were tired of a decade
of chaos and crisis, both at home and in China. The Showa leaders never estab-
lished a real consensus among the people.
Clear and Realistic Goals. Meiji leaders set clear national objectives and mili-
tary goals: protection of the sovereignty of Japan and achievement of a generally
favorable (“sixty-forty”) resolution of Russian issues. From any point of view,
the potential enemy was easy to identify—Russia—against which Meiji leaders
developed a well-thought-out strategy, involving Britain. They executed this
strategy well and firmly.
The Showa leaders, in contrast, confused their objectives. If it was to have
been a settlement of the collision with U.S. interests in China, the focus should
have been the United States; with the cooperation of other Western countries,
with which Japan had some common interests in China, Japan might have pre-
served some of its rights there. If the objective, instead, was to liberate colonies
in Asia, European colonial states like Britain, the Netherlands, and France would
have been the countries of concern. The United States and Australia, although
the latter was a member of the British Commonwealth, could in that case have
been aligned with Japan. Additionally, and surprisingly, an ally of Japan, Nazi
Germany, was helping Chiang-Kai-shek, who was fighting Japanese forces in
China. Thus the Japanese leaders of the period failed to focus on real national
objectives and so could not sort out which countries to fight and which to join.
In the end, Japan went to war against all the Western countries with presences in
the region. Additionally, the Showa leadership had no long-range strategy for
handling the relationships with the United States, Britain, or China—only stop-
gap measures essentially in reaction to a single incident.
Carefully Chosen Alliances. Meiji leaders allied themselves with the United
Kingdom, the strongest and the most influential country in the world at the
time. Japan received great benefits from this alliance with Britain. The alliance
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also isolated Japan’s adversary, Russia, from the international community, at
least partially, and made the Russian war effort more difficult.
Showa leaders, however, were not shrewd enough to identify their real part-
ner, in terms of national interests. They led the country into war against the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and China, choosing in-
stead a triple alliance (with Germany and Mussolini’s Italy) that in fact isolated
Japan itself from the rest of the world. Other than political propaganda and
some psychological effects, the Axis alliance provided almost no practical bene-
fits to any of its members. In fact, due to global sea control by the United States
and Britain, mutual assistance between Japan and the other, very distant Axis
countries was practically impossible throughout the war. Japan’s triple alliance
meant nothing to its war effort.
The Risks of Confrontation. Meiji leaders, fully taking into account the capabil-
ity of their opponent, planned and built a well balanced military force that could
meet the need in a timely manner. They ensured that adequate assets were avail-
able at the right times and in the right places.
Showa leaders were not so foresighted. They did their best, but the national
capacity of the United States, let alone the combined capability of the United
States and Britain, was too large to match. As time went by, the gap expanded
very rapidly, driving Japan into a tight and hopeless corner.
The Value of Intelligence. Meiji leaders recognized the value of high-quality in-
telligence. They made maximum efforts to collect information and extensively
used intelligence for war planning and actual operations.
Showa leaders similarly emphasized the importance of intelligence, but only
in theory, not practice. The Japanese intelligence structure at the time was poor
in both quality and size. Except for a few successful campaigns, military use of
intelligence was generally inadequate. The level of maturity of Japanese intelli-
gence was far from that of the United States and Britain.
Sabotage. Meiji leadership succeeded in disrupting the enemy by supporting in-
ternal revolutionary elements. Those activities surely had a negative impact on
the Russian war effort. The Showa leaders, however, did not even attempt this
type of campaign. The United States certainly had problems that Japan could
have capitalized upon—for example, nationwide historical racial issues, and the
relationship with Mexico.
Cooperation between the Navy and Army. In the Meiji period, coordination be-
tween the services was excellent. A telling example was the victorious campaign
at Port Arthur.
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In Showa, interservice relations were generally dominated by rivalry. Even in
1941, the Army still considered its potential enemy to be the Soviet Union, and it
was preparing for campaigns in the north. The Navy’s main concern was a
southward movement for natural resources, of which Japan was short. At the last
minute the Army reluctantly provided troops for southern operations, but it
kept its main forces in China and Manchuria. Again, except for a few successes,
coordination between the two services in the Showa era was rudimentary.
Knowing When to Quit. The Meiji leaders knew when to terminate their war
and whom to ask to mediate the peace. Showa leaders went to war against multi-
ple nations without any concrete plan for conflict termination.
Of course, these contrasts are matters of hindsight. However, the magnitude of
the change in Japanese leadership during the thirty-five years from 1905 to 1940
is easy to see. For the Japanese it is hard to accept, but this was the reality. We
should understand that for Japan the successful Russo-Japanese War was effec-
tively the beginning of the end of Imperial Japan; the great Meiji leaders were
succeeded by poor ones. The two groups were so different that we may well ask
whether the Japanese leaders in the Showa era, who led the country to total dev-
astation, were of the same Japanese race as their predecessors in Meiji, who had
led the nation to historic success.
There is an old Japanese saying, “A conceited and arrogant winner never lasts
long.” Unfortunately, we Japanese followed it exactly.
NOTE S
1. Meiji (“Enlightened Rule”) was the name given
to the reign of Emperor Mutsuhito (1868–
1912).
2. The Qing (also known as Manchu) dynasty
lasted from 1644 until the 1911 revolution.
3. The sum of 200 million tael/liang was equiva-
lent to 360 million yen at the time. This was
4.3 times as large as an annual budget of Japan
then. Hiromi Tanida, Nichi-Ro Senso yari-kuri
monogatari [A Balance Sheet of the Russo-
Japanese War], Togo (published by the Togo
Association, Japan), 16-7.8.
4. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu, Dai II Kan [Out-
line History of Major Naval Battles of the
World, vol. 2] (Tokyo: JMSDF Staff College,
Research Department, 1981).
5. Ga-Shin-Sho-Tan (Chinese reading, Wo-
Xin-Chang-Dan—literally, “Lie on a layer of
charcoal and lick liver”) was a story of the
“Spring and Autumn period” of China (770–
476 BC). In order to prepare himself to avenge
the death of his father, the king of Wu, Prince
Bu-Cha, slept on a layer of charcoal, never on
a bed. Bu-Cha denied himself all luxuries and
submitted himself to hardships. He was afraid
that a luxurious life would erode his determi-
nation. Meanwhile, Gou-Jian, king of Yue, a
longtime rival of Wu, was cutting out his own
luxuries as well. He avoided all delicious foods,
preferring to lick bitter-tasting raw liver. He
wanted from the bottom of his heart to re-
move his worst humiliation, a defeat by Wu
at the Battle of Hui-Ji-Shan. He was deter-
mined to wage and win a new war against Wu,
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and like Prince Bu-Cha he decided to spend
his days in hard living in order not to dimin-
ish his resolution (see the Kojien Dictionary
[Tokyo: Iwanami Shuppan]). This old story is
interpreted in Japan as “To accomplish fully a
long-standing objective, encourage yourself
through diligence and dedication.”
6. With regard to the decision about Anglo-
Japanese alliance, the four Genro and Prime
Minister Katsura met at Katsura’s summer
house in Hayama, a small town about thirty
miles southwest of Tokyo, on 4 August 1901.
At this meeting, the detailed idea that had
been developed by Katsura was introduced to
the members. Only Ito was against the alli-
ance; however, when Ito saw the support of
the other three Genro, he compromised and
lent his support to the idea. With the Genro
behind the idea, Katsura was convinced that
it was the correct course and he proceeded to
enact the plan. But Ito was not fully con-
vinced yet. He was still afraid of the over-
whelming Russian power. This fear drove
him to make an additional but last-minute
personal attempt to seek a Russo-Japanese
treaty. One thing the Russian government
should have taken into consideration was the
real position of Ito. In other words, he was
one of the Genro, who were still influential in
Japan, but at the same time, as an individual,
he was simply a Japanese ex-politician with
no official authority. Although Ito was not in
a position to represent Japan, the Russian
government took him to be the right person
to talk to about the issue. The Japanese gov-
ernment, however, was embarrassed by his
private diplomatic activity. In addition to its
initial mistake, the Russian government
showed poor understanding of Japanese soci-
ety and of Ito’s influence in the government
by making a fool of him when he visited St.
Petersburg. They tried to buy time by a display
of cooperativeness on Manchuria and Korea.
But the final position, sent to Ito in Berlin, was
disappointing, insisting upon unlimited Rus-
sian rights in Manchuria and only limited Jap-
anese rights in Korea. Thus Ito was betrayed
and his private diplomacy, which might have
broken Katsura’s pro-Western attempt, finally
failed. This failure eventually gave a boost to
Katsura’s effort. At the same time, Russia lost
all credibility within the Tokyo government.
The mistaken selection of a negotiating
partner and the mistreatment of Ito gave a
powerful weapon to the Japanese govern-
ment. Ryotaro Shiba, Saka-no-ue-no-kumo
[A Biography of the Akiyama Brothers] (To-
kyo: Bungei Shinju, 1970), vol. 2.
7. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu.




The Russian army in the Far East had been
reorganized and concentrated into two
separate army corps, one responsible for
operations in southern Manchuria and
the other stationed in the Ussuri area.
•
Additionally, two active army corps, four
reserve infantry divisions, and one active
cavalry brigade in European Russia were
assigned as ready reinforcements for the
Far East.
•
All troops east of the Baikal were
reorganized into one army corps (III
Army Corps) and were to be transported
to the Ussuri area.
•
A food supply for six months was stored
in Asian Russia.
•
The Russian governor general in the Far
East had been delegated the authority to
defend the area by the tsar. He thought a
war against Japan was necessary; however,
he needed to buy some time to allow III
Army Corps to arrive. Construction of




Two Russian infantry battalions were
stationed at the Yalu River.
•
Construction of troop camps was under
way.
•
Stockpiling of war material and purchase
of twenty thousand army horses in
Manchuria were being expedited.
•
The first reinforcements, two thousand
troops, had arrived at Liaoyang.
•
All Japanese residents in Vladivostok had
been ordered by the Russian governor to
evacuate to Khabarovsk.
•
The Russian Far East Force had been
mobilized.
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9. Colonel Motojiro Akashi was assigned this
mission and conducted various activities to
support revolutionaries in Russia. He also
helped secessionists in Finland and Poland,
mainly by providing funds, to support Rus-
sian revolutionists indirectly. It is difficult to
identify specific footprints of his activities in
Europe, due to the clandestine nature of his
mission, but his postwar promotion to gen-
eral clearly shows the government’s satisfac-
tion with him. Yoichi Hirama, Nichi-Ro Senso
ga kaeta sekaishi [World History Changed by
the Russo-Japanese War] (Tokyo: Fuyo-
Shobo-Shuppan, 2004).
10. Hirama, Nichi-Ro Senso ga kaeta sekaishi.
11. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu.
12. This second idea was developed by the opera-
tions officer of the Combined Fleet, Com-
mander Saneyuki Akiyama. The Japanese
navy had sent Akiyama, as a lieutenant, to the
United States to study tactics and operations
of the U.S. Navy. During his stay he met
many of its leaders. He tried to become a stu-
dent of the Naval War College, at Newport,
Rhode Island, but failed. The most important
thing, for him as well as the Japanese navy,
was that he met Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan
several times and learned the basic tenets of
Mahan’s teachings. Though he would display
a strong sense of rivalry against Japan in later
years, Mahan took good care of this young
Japanese officer. During the Spanish-American
War, Akiyama joined Admiral William T.
Sampson’s fleet at the blockade of Santiago
de Cuba, a fact that might give insight into
his ideas for blockading Port Arthur. After his
return to Japan, the Navy assigned Akiyama,
now a lieutenant commander, to develop ba-
sic tactics and operational concepts for the
Japanese fleet, looking ahead to the coming
warfare against a formidable Russian fleet.
Finally, as a commander, Akiyama was ap-
pointed as Admiral Togo’s operations officer,
which he remained for the duration of the
war, developing all the operations and cam-
paign plans of the Combined Fleet. So, in
terms of naval operations, it could be said
that Akiyama designed the war and Togo exe-
cuted it. Kinji Shimada, Amerika ni okeru
Akiyama Saneyuki [Lieutenant Saneyuki
Akiyama: His Day in America] (Tokyo: Asahi
Shinbun, 1975).
13. Some of the warships retired to Port Arthur,
where they were ultimately destroyed by the
Imperial Army’s Long Range Heavy Artillery
for Hard-Targets Unit, which started shelling
the harbor on 18 August. Five ships—the bat-
tleship Tsesarevich, the cruiser Novik, and
three destroyers—escaped to Kiaochow Bay,
China, where Tsesarevich and the destroyers
were interned by local German officials. Novik
was able to resupply and headed for Sakhalin
but subsequently was destroyed near there by
two Japanese cruisers. All of the other ships
of the squadron suffered similar fates.
14. Sekai Kaisen-Shi Gaisetsu. The “engagement
in depth” concept comprised search and re-
connaissance by scouting ships employed
ahead of the main force; a daytime gun en-
gagement by the main body of battleships
and armored cruisers; a follow-on engage-
ment by cruisers; a night torpedo assault by
destroyers and torpedo boats; a second gun en-
gagement by the main force, possibly the next
day; continued torpedo assault by destroyers
and torpedo boats the next day; a final gun
engagement by the main force near Vladivos-
tok; and minelaying at the mouth of Vladi-
vostok Harbor.
15. Keigo Yoshida, “Track of Imperial Navy to
Create Perfect Victory at Battle of Tsushima,” in
Soshyutsu no koseki [Research on the Battle of
Tsushima] (Tokyo: Suzusawa-Shoten, 2000).
16. Ibid.
17. The Showa (“Enlightened Peace”) era was the
reign of Emperor Hirohito, 1926–89.
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